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I ID DUCT I' N
The subject of this discussion might suggest that
there is * problem of great pre portions In the armed
frrces with respect tc unauthorised medical treatment,
i.e., treatment without the patient 1 s consent, fortunately,
however, such does net appear to be the case. There Is
n t a single reported case since the adoption of the Uniform
Code of * llltarv Justice :f a serviceman being eurt-
martialed for failing to bey an order to submit If medical
treatment, and there are no rep rted eases hldin, the
United States or a service d'Ct r liable Tzr performing
unauthorised treatment.^ It is possible, h wever, that
some of these latter "incidents" have been settled by
means other than litigati.n.
The general rule is reasonably well established,
without the military, that a patient must give his consent
before mecical treatment can be administered to him. It
is the purp se ef this aiacusein to oevelop ai;d examine
1. The term "armed f rces" is intended to include all
the armed forces, *ver, no direct reference will
be made in this study tc the Coast Juard since it
has nc raaj-r medical facilities r medical corps.
The Public Health ervice Is primarily responsible
T r furnishing medical treatment t. members .f the
C'sst Guard and their dependents (J4.2 U.r. C. 1253) 1 19W
2. Coward, Felpractice ard the Service D ctor g 9 U. '. rmed
Pcrcea Med. J. 22k (W ).
-K* tw
•11 aspects of this general rule and t 1st at thoaa
types of aituati na preeenting the greatest legal peril
to the aervlce d.ct r. Consideration Is given to pertinent
military regulations to determine their effect en the eneral
rule. Finally, certain conclusions and rec: rnmendatic ns are
submitted dealing with the unique problems generated by
having the sick and injured subject t military suthorlty
and c 1.
It is net the purpose f this discussion, unless
germane to the text, to consider the nature ar.d extent
of the United States' liability fcr unauthorised treatment
undar the Federal Tort Claims *ct f Kilitery Claims Act,
Foreign Claims Act, or thcr statutes, as this subject t
been adequately set forth and analysed in a number of
other writings.^ Aside from the liability of the United
atea, It is important for the military practitioner
to remeraber that he la not exempt from individual liability
or responsibility merely because he is practicing his
3. ree I archus, radical alpractlce, Hospital egllgence
and" the 'rmed f crvlees , ay 1957 (unpublished thesis
presented to The Judge Advocate General 1 a 1,
U. . rmy)i Madden, Ipraot ice Liability , 13 K*d.
Bull., U. i. Army, Vuroce 262 (1956); Hakeatrav,
fdprnctlce p.nd H*e Hlt-- r ct ? •
'J * 3 * A *r y° rc*
77 ull., Nov. 1961, p. 3; Coward, supra note 2.
- •
profession at a member of the armed forces.^"
The terma "service d. ct r" end "military practitioner,"
and all almilar designati ns, are used In this study as a
matter of convenience to Include all these persons in the
armed f roes responsible f r administering medical, dental,
leal treatment; e.g., physicia s, surge: ns, osteopaths,
dentists, nurses, and corpsraen. The terra "medical treatment,"
unless thervisa indicated, is also used as a matter of





The subject if "malpractice in the military" is a
very br^ ad one indeed, Involving an aim at innumerable
li*t of legsl aspects arising while the >elatj Lp of
doct:r snd patient exists. The general subject has been
"treated" by several writers. rdinarily the term
"jwlpractlce" is ass elated with the term "negligence,"
i.e., tbi practitioner's failure t„ comply with the standard
f c-nduct established by the reasonable and rdinsry practice
of practitioners in the sane general locality. It is
k» '"ee adden, p. clt. «uprs n te 3; Wlnthr: p, Mlltsry
: aw and Precedents, o. r. 5 (2d e . 1920).
5. Coward, op. clt. *upra note 2j Msrchur, -~dden, Hakestraw,
op. clt. supra note 3.
6. Pr-sser, Torts I 31 (2d ed. 1955); 41 Am. Jur. Physicians
and ur eons 162 (1^2); Sins v. Cwens, 33 Gal. 2d 749,
753, 20o ?.2d 3, 5 U949).
,4fl*«<
«
this form f malpractice that Is met often litigated in
the courts and is usually the greatest concern t
medical profession.
This discussion, however, fccuses on another type of
malpraotice - unauth rized medical treatment, i.e., treat-
ment perf rmed without the express r implied consent of the
patient. 'uch treatment constitutes «tn assault and battery?
which may subject the practitioner t criminal prosecution
or render him civilly liable for damages. The c:urt in
Q
Physicians 1 and Dentists' Business Bureau v. Dray 7 related
unauthorized treatment to malpractice in the following
language:
while an unauthorized operation is, in contemplati
of law, an assault and bettcry, it als- amounts to
malpractice, even thou h negligence is not charge .
Hersog, Medical Jurisprudence, 15 3» llcO, defines
malpractioe as follows: "Malpractice, sis some-
times called 'malapraxls, ' means bad or unskilled
practice, resulting in Injury to the patie ;t,
7. few courts, representing a small minority, have held
that unauthorized treatment is not distinguishable from
other f rms f malpractice nod, therefore, c a titutes
"negligence." See. e.
. , oilman v. Drake, 130 W.Va. 229,
U3 • .2d 57 (19U7) ; Hershey v. Peake, 115 Flan. 562,
223 "ac 1113 (1'2U).
8. See State v. :ile, ash. 12, 35 r c. Ij.17 (1 lk)l
Vinthrop, Digest of Opinions of the Judge *dv cates
eneral , p. 3k (r v.ed, 1901); Hlrsch, Consent To
odical rreatsient - With Forms, Irial Lawyer 1 s 0-uide,
Aug. 1-61, p. 123.




and comprises all set* and cmlsel. us uf a physician
or surgeon as such tc a patient as such, which way
make tne physician or sur^e-. n either clvlllv or
criminal .? lable."""ej
? ' e.;sl 1 nlflci.nce f ssault a.;d Battery Classification
The classification of the action f r unauth rised treat-
ment as one of a sault find battery rather than as an action
of negligence has several legal consequences. e a at
important pf these conseque nces are:
First . In an action f . r negligence the dect r would
be able fee rely upon expert testimony tc the effect that
he had in feet c mplled with the standard of care n:rmally
exercised by reasonable doctors under like circumstances,
whereas in an action for assault and battery, the d ctcr
could n t rely upon expert testimony since the inly Issue
Is whether the patient consent ed.^^
Second . The plaintiff in an action for assault and
battery need n t sh w a-iy physical Injury to establish
10. The plaintiff In a malpractice case generally has
a very difficult time in obtaining expert testlm ny
favorable t his cause. See, e. . , irist v. French,
136 C:l.App.2d 21*7, t$ , \ 7?dlOG3, 1010 (19$5)j
Huffman v. Lindquiat, 37 Cal.2d 1*6$, k <3t 2 3k • -2d
3U, k*> (195D (dissenting ni n by Garter, J.),
For a discussion of the rsas ni why d; et- rs are
reluctant to testify see, oGc id, appraisal f
Liability for Unauthorized Medical Treatment,
W ' inn. t. rtev. }<1, U32-33 d-57).

damages, whereas in en action for negligence the plaintiff
would have t prove actual damages. *
Third. The plaintiff in an action for assault and
battery is mere likely to recover exemplary or punitive
12damages ti an in an action fo* .exigence.
Fourth . An action for assault and battery generally
has a shorter statute of limitations than an action for
negligent malpractice. This is the main reason a few
courts have held th«t unauthorised treatment amounts to
negligence rather than assault and battery.
Fifth . Possibly the greatest potential unfavorable
sequence to the plaintiff "assaulted" by a service
doctcr is the effect that such classification has on a
suit brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act* Assault
and battery acti: ns are specifically excluded from the
act ^ which means a patient cannot reo ver in such an action
•gal- st the Government. The : nly recourse left to such a
patient would be an action against the d ctor as an individual
or to seek relief through private relief legislation.
11. Feststem-nt, Torts ll8 (1934).
12. Prosser, Torts /-10 (2d od. 1955).
13« ••» e . -
.
Hershey v. Peake, supra note 7» v oGlees v.
henTiF d. 60, li+Q Atl. 124 U930); Physicians'
and Dentists' Business Bureau v. ray, b Wash. 2d
111 p. 2d 560 (1941).





In /o.8 v. United States , e plelntiff was denied rec very
where hie rifsht log (when the operation was planned f . r nls
left leg) was amputated without his consent while he was
a patient In a Veteran's Hospital, The curt stated, "It
does net appear that the words Assault and battery 1 as
found in 2 U.S.C. . §26 h) have such a narrow
restricted scope as t exclude the ntifiifem f uch
sur leal operation .... The section is n t 11 ited
••16
t 1- tentlcnal or violent tcrts. The result, however,
17
w.uld be dlffere- t in th.se few jurisdictions ' where
unauthorized treatment Is held t? constitute tit ence
rather than assault and battery as the federal Tort Claims
Aet d es n t exclude "negll^e-ce."
TH- . yi .
The underlying reason behind the legal requirement
toat a medical practltl ner nust have the consent f e
patient bef re treatment la admi lstered ste s from the
"natural right f the 1- dividual." The curt In Bolster v.
"train , ' quoted apprvin ly from 37 Chic. egal News,
15. lit P. upp. ZTj (D. 'inn. 195U, aff'd, 2?< f.24 7
th Cir. 1*55).
16. Jd. fit 276-77.
17. Mt nctrs 7 ' nd 13, upra .
1 . 3- kle. 572, 1 . (191.

p. 213 as follows:
"Under a free government at least, the free citizen 1 *
first end greatest right, v.ieh underlies til .there—
the right to the Invlc lability f r.ls pars- n, i er
words, hie rig.ot t -- Is the subject f
uoivers^l acquiescence, la right necessarily
forbids a physician or
(
wever sklllfHl or
eminent, who has been asked to examine, dlagn se,
advise end prescribe . . ., to violate without
mission the fc dlly integrity of his patient by
a raaj\ i r capital ....'. rnti n, jnder
anaesthetic f r r that purp se, and BMNttlf n hla
without his consent or win! •<§• 1
"
Judge Cardoso speaking f; r the court in chl endorff v.
20
.jit y, ew York :? s;ltal expressed the view:
very human being of adult years s id sound mind
has a right t. ieter ine what shsl i be d' ne with
nis bdyj and a mm performs an perrtl n
with ut his patient's consent c mreits an assault,
f r which he is liable i i^es.
ief Judge uinn of the united States Curt of Mllitar
Appeals in a criminal case, where the issue was the
admissibility f an analysis f urine extracted from an
u conscious suspect, made tnis observati; n*
The e tire genius of ur km rican Institutions, the
guarantees f the IIU f Mghts, the protections of
the Unifc rm Code of ilitary Justice, all combine t-
establish the truth £ the aphorism "th^t a man's
is Is his castle." A fortiori then, these
lnelienable rights, w ich are implicit in the
Law f Nature, and of Mature f o
,
i that
the sanctity f the dy, mede In th
and likeness f Ood— the temple is immortal 21
soul—be and rermin forever sacred Inviolate.
19. Id. at 575, 137 Pac. at H.
20. 211 .7. 11$, 1^-130, 105 N.-. 2, 93 ii/lii).
21. United States v. Williamson, I4. 1 320, 335, 15
320, 335 ( 1*510 ; dissenting pinl n).

There are many situations, of course, whore these "natural
rights" must ^ive way to a rule ;f reason and t uchings are
permitted without the c nsent of the person touched, e. f .,
22
when sn fficer mskes an arrest.
Consent will ordinarily avoid liability for intentional
Interference with the person. Consent is not strictly speaking,
a privilege, or even a defense, but goes t negative the very
existence ~f any tcrt. Dean Grosser expresses the general
effect :f consent in the fallowing terms:
It is a fundamental principle f the common law
that volenti nrn fit Injuria — to one v c nsents,
no wrong is dene. ¥he attitude ^f the courts has
not been one of paternalism. Where no public interest
is involved, tney have left the individual to work
cut his own destiny, and are n. t c ncerned with pr -
teotlng him from his : wn folly in permitting others
t dema e him .... As to Into tional invasi ns
f t e plaintiff's interests, his consent negatives
the wrongful element of the defendant's act, and
prevents the existence of a tort. "The a.se ce of
lawful consent", said r. Justice Holmes, "is part
f the .efiniticn of an asssult." 2 3
It should be n ted at this point, alth u h the propoait
is fully explored later in the discussi n, that consent f
the patient does Bet always give the d ct.r a license to
act.
22. See Restatement, Torts il3 (193^).
|}. Pressor, T.rts 62 (2d ed. 195o-).

ran II
. : i AWFUL C
LLY
Lawful c.nsent t. meulcal treatment must be given
expressly by the patient r by someone authorized It aet
In his behalf, or implied trim the facts or circumstances}
It ma be either written or ral. Under certain conditio ns 9
the c nsent must be "informed, " i.e., the patient must have
an understanding of the pr- posed treatment and the risks
Involved. The law als- requires that the patient have the
legal capacity to co :3ent. The law provides for the satis-
faction of all tuese requirements in at: emer ency, and the
law disregards these requirements when public p lioy demands
certain treatment.
Go- sent, although expressly given, might be defective
because it vas "uninformed"; or was obtained as a result
of fraud, '.stake, coercion, minority, insanity; r the
treatment was illegal per e.
It is n t the purpose of this chapter t. set forth
an exhaustive listing of the almost infinite number of
cases touebing uptn the problem of consent. Only landmark
cases and th^ se ivlng dir^cti- r pointing t future trends
are included.
It is very dlffic It t characterize n:id label even
10

the selected cases because of the varied factual situations
ivino rise t them. However, s.me clas-ificatl n is necessary
t an orderly treatment. Tt is he ped that the author's select! n
headir.gs will prove useful in underste ding the rules.
The phrase "express Instructions," as subsequently used,
means situations where the patient has set forth* r has given
express consent that amounts t , a uefinlte and explicit
mandate t d. a certain thin,.- and n: more r n t t d. a
specific thing,
TF : T '-X-. iv^S I . JTI ': K .- v
A competent, adult patient has s right t expressly
it r It t medical treatment even if the treatment is
necessary t: preserve life, limb, of health, ^ This means
that sh rt f suicide or an attempted suicide a e --potent,
adult per ; n has an Inherent right to die or suffer in peace
without treatment being forced up.n him. The practitioner
is bcund t h nir this ; i^ht and failure t so hon r, ss
already indicated, w.uld constitute an assault sot battery;
as a corollary tc this rule a practitioner would n t be
held legally accountable f r failing tc treat such a patient
even th-u^h his action might be oriticized on ra.ral grounds
2k • Authority f- r this r ile will be found in the di^cussiin
under the heading "The Underlying Hoascn for the Consent





r by his pr.fessi 1 ass elates. ** A pers n who Is a
minor zr Incompetent lacks the legal capacity to consent,
therefore, the express Instruotlns f such a patient
would not be legally binding up~n one wht a&iinijters
treata»nt. 26
27
Tw_ very famous cases, J c. bs:n v. :• ass ^ huaetts
and
]
j£ v. Bell, have established t:.e rule that express
Instructions may be disregarded if the treatment is c elled
by a valid statute. Such statutes are generally directed
o.th practitioners and patients and beth are legally
responsible f : r c -plying with their pr viai. ;e. It has
els been held t.at pr stltutes may be examined against
29their wishes to determine if they have a venereal disease*







25. See, e. ; . , Childers v. Frye, 201 N.C. 39, 42, 1> • •
72, TO"(1'>31).
26. See, e.;,;. , Farber v. ( Ikon, 1^0 Cal.2d 503# 254 »2d 520
(19537; ratt v. D vis, 221* 1:1. 300 f 79 I.E. 562 (1906).
27. 197 U. S. 11 (1<05) (compulsry vaccination).
28. 274 U. I. 200 (1929) (c rapuls ry sterilisation)
.
2 . Laux v. Ttitt, 16 Wash. 180, 57 P. 2d 321 (1934).
30. 211 n.Y. 125, 105 V .92 ).
12

Mary 5'chloendorff entered the defer. Ltal for the
purpose of being examined under anaesthetic t*. determine
the nature f a lump In her stcmach. She elated that she
had notified the d.ct.r, "th-t there must be no op^rstl n«"
31
Lie under anaesthetic, a fibre la turner"^ was removed from
flbd men and as a result, according to a witness, "gangrene
developed In her left arm, some of her fingers had to be
•mputeted, ad her suffering were Intense," The court
denied recovery against the charitable hospital en the
basis that M master-servant relationship existed between
It ard the personnel responsible for the treatment; however,
I court stated that the actl n of the surgeon was action-
ablet "In the case at hand, the wrong complained of la
merely negligence* It Is trespass ... a surgeon who
performs an operation without his patient's consent,
commits an assault for which he Is liable In damages. **
The leading Canadian case of treatment contrary to
express Instructions Is .- alloy v. Hop San^ t The plaintiff, *^
31. A tumor made up of fibrous and muscular tissue.
32. Schloendorff v. Society of ew York Hospital, supra
note 30, at 129-130, 105 I.I. at 93- >i+.
33- ZT9357 * West. Weekly R. Hk (Sup. Ct. lberta).




a physician and surgeon, was called to the hospital to
treat defends it's hand wnich had been badly Injured in
sn autc mobile accioent. The defendant, a stranger and
unacquainted with the plai :tiff, "asked him ^he plaintiff/
to fix up his hsnd but not t cut it ft as he wanted to
have it looked sfter in I ethbridge, his home city. -fore
anaesthetic had been administered, the defendant repeated
his request that he did not want his hand cut 1 . lie
d ctor, being mere c ncerned in relieving the suffering
. f the patient, replied that he would be tl . veined by the
aiti ns f und when the anaesthetic had been ad inlstered."
An examination of the hand c uld act be carried out while
the patient was c. nscicus because the hand was covered by
sn eld piece of cloth that c-uldn't be rem ved without
severe pain. Two attending physicians agreed with the
plaintiff, after anaesthetic was given and an ex a? inati
made, that the "cenditi n f the hand was such that delay
w uld mean bl d poisoning with n possibility of saving
it." The plaintiff amputated tha hr>nd and later br ught
sctim f r his professional fee. The defendant filed
s cress-action f„r the c st of an artificial hand, loss
of wages, ad general danages. The c urt, after expressing
the opinio* that "the operation was ecessary and perf mi
in a highly satisfact ry ma ner, M denied recovery tc the







am anted to a trespass tr the pers. n uf the defendant. In
sunning up the o urt str.ted that the ue; endfint' s, "dws es,
shculd ... be substantial but only sufficient to make
then substa tial rather than nominal, I place the m unt
at f50." Recovery fcr the cost of an artificial hand was
denied en the grounds that the* est was a result .f the
accident si.u n- 1 the unauthorized operation.
lmilar case arc.se when attie I. Strain went t
r. .Inter for treatment cf an Infected f ot. She gave
him express instructions n t tc reni ve any bones* while
she was under anaesthetic the surgeon removed a ami
sesamoid bone-* to aid the drainage of the infection. The
cut held that the cL ct r committed an actl nable vr ng
by acting contrary to specific directions. An interesting
Issue in to,, case C-ncerr.td whether the patient was actually
injured by the removal cf the unnamed sesamoid b.ne,
Dr. Folcter contended that since the bone served no useful
function the patient ahouid receive no mora than nominal
damages. The appellate court rejected this argument find
35. Kclater v. Strain, J9 kla. 572, 137 Fac. 96 (1913)
«
36. Taber' a, Cycl: pedlc edlc-.i rictlonery 3-l|2 i5th ed.
1951) defines sesars- id bene" as follows: " .. al
nodule f bone or fibrocartilage in a tendon playing
over a bony surface."
15

approved damaaea of flOOO stating that!
/'Fhe jury/ Being composed rf i f ordinary
iwel.lger.ee, may have eonaulted their cwar/jn
experience, and reached the c nclusl n that
every bone In the human body serves some useful
purpose, and t>- e sesamoid bene In the plain-
tiff's foot served a purp se, and Its removal
might have resulted In Injury, the testimony
the experts to contrary notwithstanding . . . .
From the evidence, the jury mlrttt have found that
the removal of the sesamoid bone was In a measure
responsible fo» these unfavorable conditions.-3 '
Treatment should always be rendered according to the
patient's lest Instructlens, assuming, of course, that the
patient in the first instance cculd give legal .:y binding
Instructions and Is competent when the subsequent instructions
ere flvea« This rule is best illustrated by the case of
Bakewell v. Kable .-' The plaintiff in this case alleged
that the defendant, a chiropractor, had r.ade an erroneous
diagnosis f her ailment ard sug rated that certain
"sdjustments" be made. The plaintiff initially expressly
consented to having the adjustments made. However, after
the treatment had commenced, the plaintiff shcuted, " h,
that was awful • • • « Let me up, I don't want any-
more; I can't stand anymore."-^
37. ; olater v. Strain, supra note 35, at 580, 137 Pac. at 9^
3 . U$ ont. ; 9, 232 P. 2d 117 (1951).




The defendant ign: rea these last i: tions and continued
raking adjustments which resulted in the ?llen.ed injurle .
The appellate curt approval Judgment f . r the tiff on
the grounds that treatment, c tinued after the plaintiff's
last instructions, was unauth rized and arc unted t pn
aaaftult. The c urt also held tnat this am unted t
practice ever: though there was no negligence charged.
•-.
.
r :\ j. ;; : -,s X.
.
- >. - I. . I ,. •: - T
It Is quite obvious that situoti ns will p In
which it ia impracticable or impossible Is obtain express
instructions from a patient or anyone legally auth-rised
to aesume such reap.-nslbillty ; theref.re, if aut. on
is t be b-und f r the treatment, it must be implied fr
circumstances. The c urts and writers frequently
•mploy the terms ' Led in fact" 1* and "implied in
kllaw""* in diacuaslng esses where there are no express
lnstructi ns. A distinction la net atte-.pted by this
auth r as it ia n: t deemed imp . rtant to tne i dy f this
discuss! n.
ls}TftenCY Treatment
The most imp rt?nt excepti n t the eneral rule that
cn-ent mist be vbtalned pri.r t treatment is found in
UO. See, e.g., require v. Fix, 11 »e», k3k» &$ • •;>ee ,





those emergen y situation* where the patient la unable
physically ;r legally to give binding instructions, e. t .,
he is unconsci' us r s in r and is in need
medical atte: it K . In «n emer^ncy situation a practitioner
ay re-der his services according to his best judgment vith-
cut instructl ns from anyone end without incurring liability
for an assault and battery.
What is an "emergency" is a quest! n uu. n wnich the
c urts have varying pinions, therefore, a few f the
•t illustrative an;. t frequently oitea cases will
be disc ?s«d bef re a definition will be attempted.
There are tw w s in wt.Ich moat emergencies arise:
(1) ?ue t unforeeen results r discoveries occurri
after treatment, usually surgery, has begun; r | c ) as a
result f an accident. The f rmer : nly sr so with the
advent f a aect.etic Mk4 c: nl ., n t ,ave be> n envisioned
aoaai n-law rule re&ordir: .sent to treatment
was being f- rmulated. e~Lcal treatment, Including
surrlc«!l operations, wsa performed in the patient's h:.me
before anaesthetic cane into u*--e. . atiemo were uau^i y
la and d-.ct.rs could freely ask them fvr instructions.
In cases where the patient lapsed in' unconaci usnaaa,
immediate rr.e^ibers f the fanily vie * cl.se at hand t





give the needed Instructions; "Hence the court formulated
the rule that *ny extensi- n of the operation c the physician
withrut the consent of the patient or someone e.uthcriz
peak fcr hin constituted a battery or trespass *f
the perron of the patient for which the physician was
lieble in damages. ^^
s need fcr a ore nil htened view was apparent
and it would be difficult indeed f.r the author t express
this need mere succinctly than did the court in aennan •
Parsonnet :
The surgical employment, of anae .& has, as a
matter cf cemmon ki.owledga, not only eliminated
possibility cf obtaining the p.'-.tient's consent
during the mti.n, but has also had other medic
effects cf which notice must be taken. Tnus it has
rendered possible and of everyday occurrence surgical
operations -f a chsr^cter e..d magnitude not dreaded
of at the titie the common law was in the mekin; , ni«f
as a matter of prsctical moment, has ale advanced
the period that marks the commencement of a surgical
operation from tt;e time when the patient' a body ia
actually invaded by the knife to the time when the
anaesthetic is ad inistered, r at least when the
I has succumbed to its influence. The employ-
ment f anaesthesia hr.s also postponed t. this same
p« ricd of relaxation and unconsciousness the makli
of that deplete ad final diagnoala cf the patlamt'a
c ;:Gition that at c mmon law was made °t n time
when he could be be th inf . rmed and consulted.
these considerations the scope cf oaer. sur c icil
oper :'. has been greatly enlarged, nd th<
rule applicable tr.ereto extended beyond the act
emergencies cf actual surtery to ether matters rare
or less vitally affecting the patient's welfare,
let these cha ged c nditions, the rule of law
I4.3. Kennedy v. arrott, 21^3 N.C. 35£» 361^, 90 . .2d
l$k> 75S (1956).
Uk. -3 <.J.L. 20, 2;-2i4., 3 <tl. 91^, 60 U»12),
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mast, In the Interest alike of the patient i d the
surgeon, be adapted to the cha ges that have been
a, wrought, ci ief pmon£ is the unconscious
st^te f the patient at a time when by the lea n lew
rule his consent must be btalned.
How far h^ve the c urts d^red t go in permitting treatment
without consent in emer, * ncy situations?
The case a:, st .ften cited as authority for the emergency
rule is chr v. ^iMyss, "^ The .'innesota Supreme Court
expressed the rule this way:
If a pc be injurtd t t. tent of reroheri.
him unoonsc' :., and his injuries were of such Baton
as oquire pi i surgical atteo
called to attend him w uld be justified in applying
such medical r surgical treatraeot as might res ly
be necessary f r the preservation cf '< ife r
limb, and const t n the part of the Injured person
would bi. implied. And again, if, in thf csurse of
an operation t which the. petient c: nsented the
physician sh uld oisc -.tr conditions n. t anticipated
before the operation was cormencf ••.'., I hlCA i:" mot
re , w^uld -ger the life or he- lth cf II
patient, he exproaB c n ent I
ofetaiaad , 1 i justified in wt»rHll mg fell
operatl . overcome 111—
*
The court went en fee hole th«t the followl ng, fatfei did r
Justify the treatment. The plaintiff cano | 11 lama
com ' in? of difficulty with her ri^ht ear and after
examlnati n the plal-.tiff consented to an operation n
th^t ear. After the plaintiff had been anaesthetized,
the defendant surgeon found a aarlous condition to exist
in the pl-lntiff'a left tar which was n.t detectable during
U5. 95 inn. 261, lOlj. N.w. 12 $) 9
J+6. Id. *t 26,, 101; N.v,'. at 15.
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the prior examination because of an obstruction. The
defendant performed an ossiculectomy**' after reaching
•n agreement with th< Intlff 1 8 family physician that
such an operation should be perf rmed. The court I tied
that the urgency wes insufficient to perr.lt treatment with-
out express instructions. It made rut a whit of difference
that the operation was skillfully performed and Mil
beneficial t the patient. The t'?eetnent am. unted to an
•••suit Rid battery.
In in ; v. -rney , the plnlntiff came t; the
defendant asking "to be fixe beer children . . • •"
Thereun n the defendant trade a physical examination and
recommended an operation. -intiff expressly con-
sented to the recommended • perati: n. The defendant upon
discovering dl?e*sed varies si tubes extended
the operation to pr vide f r their rem- val. The defe.dnnt,
and r>n ther doctor whe assisted with the peratirn, testified
that it was necessary to r-r ve the diseased .3 in
crder to preserve the plaintiff's life *A he , end
it would have beer di ;s to her life and health not
do s' . The curt ir .in, f. r the defendant stated;
If in <v urae :f an operaticn t wf ich
patient c::se -.-ted the physician should dUc ver
conditlrns not antic lp«ted befre the . perr-tlon
was oonaincea, and which, if n t rem.ved, would
U-T • 'xcisi.n f a sr.all bone from the er,






endanger the lift r feftf -lth f the p-'tient, he
would, th u h n- express consent mi . utained
Iven, be justified In extending the \ti n
t reave inl overcome then . • • innumerable
cases from other jurlscieti _ns ar£ c 1 ated wherein
the sane principle is rec ^.nlzed.^
m result was differe* t in a more recent "Fall plea
tube" case.^ Mactne ?atoora o in r twenty years of &S«f
agreed t l appendectomy that was to be perf. rmed by the
defenda t. irlnf the 'perati-n the surgeon discovered
that the plaintiff's F Ian tubes were full of pus,
swollen, an5 sealed at both en 3. The defendant proceeded
to rem; ve the tubes because they would have had to come
out "vlthln six month "-ray if I tfftl n.-t mistaken."
The defends t -s supported by expert trstim ny to the
effect that there was a darger of the t.bcs breaking and
51
cr>u2i £ peritonitis, e defendant didn't receive
express consent from anyone ever though the patients
stepmother was in the hoscltal «t the tl In holding
f r the olaintiff the court stat<
evidence offered d es n-t Justify the conclusion
as a mntter of law that there exir= 10 emergency
of such immediate urgency es tc justify the r val
f the tub s wi tat u t the • .sent f the patlfttt or
her step ther. The evidence indicated that removal
f the tubes probably would be ncc 7 soon, what
their resvLnin;; in the body in their swollen and
infects n was dangerous, but it did n t
Id, at 61;, 204 ?ic. at 272.
. M r v. ocobee, 29a . . 2d U7o- (Ky. 1951).





ilsh that tr.elr r tooval was an emerge
In the sense death would likely ensue
•Iran- oUtcli' If the tub* s were net rex:, vtc .
ltht; -. t deloj In their renuvs.
rmful, even fatal, there wai stili rime t
the parent end the patient thr opportunity to
weigh the fateful queotl-.n."
In ..oai v. rlchw rth,^ the defendant if :i rex,
the diseased tonsils d adenolus of an sloven yet
:
c' lid without tLe c nsent . f a parent cr the On.lid, ever,
an adult sister did lve pirmlasl.n. The c- lid as
a result if the anaesthetic. *nt wao OMOOOOOOful
In rec damages In the trial c urt, but the case was
reversed en appeal. Hate court Leldj
ca shows thst tt.ere was on Obo< lute
necessity f r n • parotic n, but
emergent In the sense t at death would likely
result lmpix dlately upon failure to perform It.
In factT It 1b not c r.t' .ded thst any real danrer
vc uld have resulted t the child faed time boon
en t consult the p* rent with refe bo
operation. Tr erefr re, one operatl on was n t
Justified upon r u ... that an emergency ex-
isted. 5U
n arldrr.t type ewer. • cy was dealt with In Luke v.
,
-rle .-'^ A fifteen ye' r I Id 007 fell ur. ho whet
if a treln and his left frot was crushed. e wes taken
to a and I .ly after arriving he laosec In
oosiplete unconsciousness. fter consulting f ur h use
Tabor v. ee, supra note $0, at i4.76-i4.77.
53. ZtZ >. . 22$ tfex, 1920), This act:
rlo* t 1 1 ; see V) . . VU . .
17).
55. 1 ch. 122, 136 H. . Ii06 (LA.).
I ,
frtf
physicians, the defendant surgeon amputated the boy's
injured foot. It was agreed by all the physicians that
en immediate amputation was necessary tc save the boy's
life. express instruct! ns were received from anyone.
The c: urt held f r the defends <t due to the emergency
nature of the trer-tment.
The fact that surge ns are called upon dally,
in all t ur large cities, t operate insta tly
in emergency cases in order that life may be
preserved, should be considered. any small
children ore Injured upon the streets in large
cities. To held that a surgeon must wait until
perhaps he may be able to receive the consent
r t the parents bef: re giving to the injured one
- benefit f his skill and learning, t: the
end th^t life may be preserved, would, we believe,
result in the loss of many lives which Blgfet
therwise be saved. It is net to be presumed
at oo pe tent surgeons will wantonly operate,
n r will they fail %c obtain the consent I
f
parents to operations where such consent may
^,
be reasonably obtained in view f the exigency.-*"
tfaer case involving an accident emergency Is
57Jackovech v. Yocoro . A seventeen yesr old pl^i tiff
was 1 v lved in an accident while riding en a frei&ht
train. The defendant Vftf called to the scene a few
rr-lnutea after the acclde t and found the plaintiff suffering
fnm serlcus head injuries and a crushed arm. The dect r
t k the plai; tiff t his office where he tried to entact
his parents wh lived tost ten miles distant. Two other
56. J£. at 135, 136 N.w. at 1110, 1111.




physicians wars called in to assist the defendant, and
oil agrsfd that the arm should be amputated, whereupon
it was. The plaintiff later sued the defendar t surgeon
f r perf r ing the operation without tomssatj it was
sis alleged that the operation was unnecessary. The
curt is hi ding that the emergency justified the
defe riant 1 s action stated:
While the courts ars n t entirely in harmony upon
the question of consent to an operation, ws think
the better reasoning aupc rts the prop. sition that,
if a surgeon is confronted with an smern;oncy which
endangers the life or he«lth £ the patient, it is
his duty to dr. what the rccasi n d—ianil within the
usupI & customary practice among physicians and
surgeons in the sas or similar lo*alltlsst vitnout
the consent of the pa tier t.
5
In Pratt v. "vls,^ where the defendant allegedly
remved t: e plaintiff* a uterus without her consent, the
c urt stated as s general prep sition of law:
Where the patient desires or consents that an
operation be performed, and unexpected conditions
develop or are discovered in the c, urse f the
operation, It is the d ty of the surge un, in
desling with th^se c nditiens, to act n his own
discretion, making t e hiphest use . f his skill
and ability to meet the exigencies which confr nt
hira, and in the nature f things he must frequently
do this without cons.- tr ti- n .r c-.nference with
any ne, except, perhaps, other members f his
pr- fessi.n who are: assisting him, encies
srise, end when a surgeon is called it is someiimes
found that s.me action must be taken immediately
f r t e preservation of the life lid health of
the patient, where it If i - r-'cticable t obtain
58. Id. at 925» 237 N.W. at M|9. (Emphasis supplied.)





the c nsent f the ailing or injured one or :f
eny one authorised to soesk for him. In .such
event, the surgeon may lawfully, and It la his
duty to , perform such operation ps good surgery
a. I 37, with ut z ici: mmitii
Whet is en emergency? Tw; of the cited cases"1 would
restrict the emergency exception tc these situations where
"death would likely ensue (result) immediately" if such
treatment were n t performed* This is an extreme view
and was probably applied in the Tabor case because the
treatment involved t: e organs of reproduction* No
exolanstlon is offered f • r the language in the pes
ease as such language wes unnecessary to reach the h lding,
i.e., the court c. uld have held f r the plaintiff using
the language of the hldin? in > hr v. Williams .®2 The
author concludes from the foregoing that except in these
few Jurisdictions applyin the strict rule set f rth in
Tab r n^d Moss , the practitioner can rely on the definition
that follows, in determining if he should act wit..cut
express instructions or wait until such instructions are
received. An emergency exists in th.se situetl ns where
the oatient is in need of pr apt medical treatment fof
the protection of his life, or t prevent serious impair-
ment to health or limb and is unable t give express
instructions to the practitioner because of unconsciousness,
60. Id. at 309, ;10, 79 l«B« at 565. (aphasia lie*.)
61. Tab:r v. c bee, supra note 50 and oss v. Rlchw rth,
supra page 23.





insanity, intoxication or 8 W ther physical or legal
incapacity, and there is no legal representative reasonably
available whc c uld ive legally effective instructions t.n
his behalf.
In Justifying the practitioner's acticn the courts
en employ t e fiction of implied consent. The court
in the pen ran case ^ went so far as to suggest "... it
is imperative that the law shall in his ^patient X &J interest
raise up some one to act f r him • .
.
," and recommended
as a solution that the law should cast the responsibility
on the prsctiti- ner becsuse by levv 1 Implication "the
patient intended him t act f r him when he made
other selection."
*
Several of the ab ve quotes state th*t the practitioner
w jld be "Justified" in rendering emer ency care; wi uld
the pr*ctiti ner be Justified in net rendering such care?
The Jack: vach and Pratt"' cases express the view that
63» Note 14;, supra .
61*. 83 ".J. . 20, ?i|t 83 Atl. 914-8, 950 (191< .
6£. Ibid .
66. ' iscuased on pages 2l|-25» supra .




the practitioner has a "duty 11 to «ct In an emergency.
ne recent case seems to ra^ke this a legally enf rceable
68
duty. In Kolesar v. United t t,
s
, the patient had a
osrdisc arrest during the course :f an abdominal operation*
The court hr-ld that In such a situation the survecn was
negligent in falling tz perform a th' rac t my * and manual
cardiac massage In time to prevent brain Injury to the
patient where such a procedure was practiced in the area
where the hospital was located. The court in effect
stated th t in such an emergency the largeon owes a duty
pati-nt to perform the necessary additional
operation, and a failure to carry out this duty am unts
to : . 'tnce. Precedent is 1 . f e r holding a
or otlti ner liable f r refusln t: treat a person, who
70
is •. t the patle t of the practitioner, in an emergency.
68. 198 F."upp. 51 7 . . Pla. 1961).
69» ur leal incision of b e cht st wall.
70. The position :f the Asierican Kedical As ci tlcn




of foe Judicial Council , . . ., p. 27 ( 19b0 eo.
|
as fcl owa: "A physician Is free t choc se whom
he will serve. Re shculd, however, respond
any request for his assistance In an emergency or





The most frequent appllceti n of the d. corine of
implied consent occurs when lent is treated by a
doctor during a routine office cell. The patient usually
walks in and explains the oature cf his oilmen t, ad the
doctor proceeds to make an examination. This examination
mcst ften requires a t~ucMng and seldom will the doct
ask, M d. y.u consent t this t uohing"? Such a x, uching
would t amount Of 8 battery as the patient by submitting
the examination has by implicati n iven his consent.
The 04 urt in :: t te v. Housekeeper ' stated, "If the
plaintiff alleges that there was n consent, he must
establish his affirmation by proof. The party who allows
a surgical operation t be performed is presumed t have
empl yed the surgeon f r that particular purpose."
Accord in ly following charge wat expressly approved
wles v. Blus« ' whrre n .kin graft was taker, fi-
the plaintiff's leg allegedly without his consent:
I charge y u that, If plaintiff v lunt~rily submitted
to the operation — thet is, knew it was about to be
performed, I made n: objection — his consent i
be presumed, unless he was the victim of a false
and fraudulent representation; this last a fact to
be made reasonably cle r by the: evidence.
71. TO X4U 162, 170-171, 16 Ml. 3 2. 3 4 U889).






In Mc lulre v. ,hix# consent t set fl fracture by surgery
was held to be Implied where the plaintiff with a broken
ankle b ne willingly Meompaaled the doot r t: the hospital
for the purpc se f having the fracture reduced ai d was
voluntarily placed under anaesthetic for that purp.se,
has also been held thet general instructions
by a patle t t hia surgeon authorizing him te operate
for the cure it a apecific physical condition, not
only autio rizes such cperation, ut also et zes the
surgeon, "by clear implication," to diagnose the caae
t * pertain for himself the exact cause ,f t stient's
ailment and to moke preliminary explorat ry I.iOisi:ns
which may be necessary tow t at purp: ae. '^
In 1 core v. ebb , '^ the curt held that going t the
office of one dentist m the & vice of another dentist
t Imply authority for t he f :; rmer to extract eight
teeth while the patient was under anaestnetic a "d hadn't




, an 'my sergeant's wife
entered a naval hos it'l ass a llltarj dependent for
prenatal care. The evidence established that there waa
n soecifie I at by her t t: e u, e f a spl anaesthetic,
73. 118 Neb. k3>hf 2*5 N.v. 120 (1929).
714-. Kin,.' v. C rney n te i+8, ' upra .
75. 3i+5 i«V»M 239 (Mo. 1961).




hovevfr, sha entered the hospital for ttu ress purp.aa
of giving birth and such birth was lnar.inent upon c.dmisslv-n.
Under these circumstances the court f und t at






It has been shown that n practitioner, in the absence
f fn emerr-ency, roust have the express r implied c nsent
of a patient or of s meone authorised t speak on his behalf,
before trcotme t csn be lawfully administered t. nim. However*
merely because a patient gives general consent or signs a
consent f rn doesn't mean that the doctor has fulfilled all
of his duties to his patient. Tue practitioner always has
the duty of seeing t at the patient's consent is not defective,
i.e., It was informed end was n t brought about t coercion,
fraud, mistake, or incapacity.
.:. : ; NT
recent trend of the oases nakes it evident that,
tc be legally valid, cn.ent t; medical treatment must be
an intelllt•« t, informed consent with an understanding
what is t bi c us ana the risks 1 v Ived. ' Uninformed
sent is defective c: nse t. The underlying reas r
the consent requirement was said to be the right f a
p rson "tc determine wh»t shall br done with his body."'
If a doctor treated a patient n the basis of fact-s known
77. Althoufh the recent cases have sh wn a definite trend
ward requiring a more infer ed consent, the concept
itself is an lc -. ne; ae , e.,;. . Hunter v. as,
1'3 Va. 1.3, 96 . . 360 (19187.
7 . .c: chlo^no rff v. I clcty :. f New Y rk Hospital, supra
page 8.
5»f. 1*11 M * ••Ut»+4 v
banr **v
LA
only t the deter, It weald te the d^ctcr and not the
patient who woule. be decidin uld be done with the
patient' s body.
A dllerana is created fir the praetitiontr where a
disclosure I I fact .. e injury to the
patient r aggravate an exist! idition. This was
definitely recognized in , I K . v. Lela;,d Stanford Jr.
University B:ard of Trustees '* where the court expressed
the view:
physic! j his iuty t patient and
subjects himself to liability if he withh Ids any
facts which are necessary t:; form the basis of an
Intelligent concent by the patient tc the pr: posed
treatment, likewise the physician may net minimize*
the knewn degrees f s pr cedure or opera'. In
order to induce his patient 1 s consent. At the same
time, trie physician must place the welfare f his
patient ab ve all else m ry fact places
him in a p; siti n in which he sometimes must ch ose
between two alternative c. urses -f act ae is
t explain t the patient every risk attendant up
any surgical procedure ,£ operatic*, no matter h. w
remote. This may well result in alarming a patient
wh: la already unduly apprehensive and wh. may as a
result refuse to undertake surgery in which there Is
in fact r.inimal risk; it ney als , result in act,
increasing the risks by reason :f the physi- logical
result cf tht apprehension itself. The ether is t
rec gnlze that each patient presents a separate
pr blem, that the patient's me> tal and eractlonal
condition is imp . rtn a% ond in certain oases may be
crucial, nat in discussing t e element of
risk a certain a-ount of discretion must be employed,
consistent with the full disclosure f facts necessary
t an informed c nse-t.-"^
79. 1514. Cal.App.2d 560, 317 P. 2d 170 (1957).
BO. Id. at 57B, 317 .2d at 11.
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This discussion will be 11 itisd to • c nslderation of the
legal prece as reported la the eases and will not
attempt to cover he "ought" or moral consider as Inherent
In the problem.
In : .,-ng v. G
-
1 s T . r Hospital, the itlff
gave his consent t sfeasant ourgeon t . ro i
-iBurethrel prostatic re&ecti Dui ..he course f
the o?< rati n his spermatic ocrd was severed, rendering him
rile. It was the plaintiff's contention that nothing had
1. For a dlscussl n f the OFtl viewpoint see Pletcher,
orals : ediclne , Princeton, . '. . , . £2t« :>r. iletcher
concludes on ?p. 60-61: " y way of summary, we may say
that In general we can validly assert our right as
potienta to know the medical facts ab ut ourselves*
veral reasons have been ^Iven fir it. but perhaps
I four fundamental onee are: first, that as persons
our human, morsl quality la taken away from ua If w®
are denied whatever kn wledge Is available! second,
t the doctor Is entrusted by us with what he le rns,
but the facts are ours, not his, and t deny them to
us is t" steal from us what is our own# not ^is;
third, that the highest conception of the physiclan-
pstleot relationship is a personallstic ne, la t
11 it f which wo see that the fullest possibilities
of medio el treatment and care in tneraaelves depend
upon mutual respe- t and confidence, os well as up n
technical skill; and fourth, that to deny a patient
knowledge f the facts as to life and death Is to
assume reepnslbllities which cannot be carried c ut
by anyone but the patient, with his own knowlec
of r is wn affairs. . . . See 31 .... lav,
1157 (1956) for the report of a symposium discus ing
is and oth€«r topics contained in Dr. Pletchcr's
provocative be k.
62. 251 'inn. kZl f 88 ».W.2d 16 (1*$S),
83. is operation Involves a partial excision of the






been said concerning the fact that he would be rendered
sterile by the operati n, consequently the treatment was
unauth rized and amounted t an assault. The Supreme
Court of : innesete held that, in the absence of an immediate
•mer^ ency, t e patient ^.h.uld have been informed bef.re uhe
operati D that if his spermatic c^rd were partially removed
it v: uld result in his sterilization, and he should «lso
have been advised that if this were n t done there wouia
be e possibility of dangerous lnfecti:n. 2 court c ncluded
that the question of whether he consented t the ope ratio
a
actually performed should have been submitted to the jury*
The ease recognises that toe patient must be made aware of
the contingencies Involved end given a free choice to
determine wo at should be done with his body.
In a recent I lssourl case, toe plaintiff alleged that
the defe- c* ts, a psychiatrist and his ass elates, were
negligent in not informln., lata f the danger involved I
eombined else or -an: ok and iosulin subcoma therapy f:r
emotional lioness. The plaintiff sustained several fractures
during the c: urse f the treatment. The appellate court
in ordering a new trial n the ground that the jury instructions
were mlsleadin , stated:
In the psrti cireumsta ces of this record,
naldering tie naturt ltchell'e illness and
is rath' i and radical procedure with its
rather hioh 1 cldence of serious and permanent
injuries n. t conn- cted with the illness, the
35
it: i i : - - ie»J
i
doctors :wed their patient in possess! n of his
faculties the duty to inform hire ^enorally of the
ssible serious collateral haaards; sod in the
detailed circumstances ther<- was a aubraiasible
fact issue of w: ether the dtct.rs were negligent
in failiQg tc inform him of the dangers of shook
therapy. 8*
t exhaustive discussion of the rule requiri
an informed consert, including a discus si n of the fcregcing
precedents, is found in the %w opinions f frotonaon v. Kline. ^
In this case the plaintiff sued a radi _st, ellog!
that she had suffered injuries as a result of ccbalt radiatin
therapy where the hexards hao. n t been explains t; her
prior t treatment. The plaintiff appealed an adverse
finding by the lower court fine, in ordering that the
bo retried, the appellate court in its first opinion 04
forth the prevailing view as follows
:
In our opinion the proper rule f law to determine
whether p pptlent h«s given em intelligent consent
to a pi sed form of treatment bg a physician was
stated Li*d in I v. Lei and Stanford, tc.
Bd. Trustees , supra . This rule in effect compels
disclosure by the physic inn In order t- assure tv
m infermed consent of the patient is tbtsint- . .m
duty I physician tc disclose, however, t ed
to those disci, sures which a reasonable medic
practitioner w- uld moke under the sa e or similar
circumstances. How the physician may best discharge
I obligation t- the patient in this difficult
situation involves primarily a question of medical
-k* itchell v. • ninson, 33U - .?d 11, 19 I960).
Kan. 393, 350 ^.2d 093 (I960); opinion clarified




Judgment. So lcng as the disclosure Is sufficient
tc insure ai informed consent, the physician's c ice
of plau c urses should not oc c«ll>
quessin if it pp e : , 11 circumstances considered,
that the physician was activated ,nly by tient's
at tl utic interests and he pr eeeded as
compete- t msdleal men w. uld have dene in I r
The courts in ltchell ?nd Natanson were obviously
activated in their hoidin r< by he high degree of risk
Involved in the treatment, however, the :i c' I f law
set forth in tr e pi c Mia1 ,;ivo new impetus t se
erest«d in finding new causes f motion; i.e., exigence
actions basec . uninformed consent. ' The tttt v raised
by these tw cases has been acmewhst tempered by subsequent
decisi ns. In 31 Fill aten, the court eld there
waa n duty imposed m I su ^erftrmed a thyroidectomy
to way* the sett f possible Injury to laryngeal nerves
where it w&s n. t the practice cf surgeons in the area I
warn of suoh p ssitle injuries. The eneral rule was recently
tested again in Gcvln v. Hunter, where the plaintiff allege*
, Id. at Iv09-l4JLO, 350 ?.2d it 1106.
?or s critical discussi-n cf the trend toward a more
lnformt ".sent see lete, : alprao t ice— hya 1 c 1 c Haa
a Duty To Inform Patient ;f Kisk Inherent
eatment , ' ; . '*-. I, Rev. 768 ( 1 v61 ) r. nd p f enhelm
»
In^o rr nsent t. Medical Tr< .t, 11 Clc\ .L.
1962).
. 173 a. 2d 333 (Del. 1941).
. y?k t.U fctl | yc. l t*t).
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bi
she should have been advised that the recommended operati I
for relief of her varic se veins w uld entail multiple
incisions and additional scare and disfigurement of the leg,
end that ?uch failure of the doctor t fully apprise her
constituted malpractice. The court followed Natsnson as
tc a duty to reveal any serious risks, e.g., *v* realise
that under certain circumstances a physician has a duty
to reveal ay serious risks which are involved in a con-
90
temple ted operation . . •" ; however, the court followed
1 Hippo in determining if the circumstances f the case
required an explanation tc the present plaintiff, e.g., "Whether
r n t a surgeon is under • duty to warn a patient f the
possibility of a specific adverse result if a pr posed
treatme t depends upon the circumstances :f the particular
esse and upon the general practice followed by .he medical
91professi n in the lccality , • • ." The court went on
to p it out t at the custom of the medical profession to
warn patients of possible adverse effects of pr~psed treat-
ment must be established by expert testi ny.
ther fairly recent case has added a new dimension
t- the doct r's dilemma re^ardi informed a nse t, i.e.,
t o much Informeti n may const! tu e a cause of action.
92
In Ferrara v. a 11 uchip , a patient developed "cancero phobia*
90. Ic. at I4.23.
91. Id. at k2k*










when * dermatologist told ber that X-ray burns on her
sh ulder might be cancerous rnd si e should have the burns
exaninrd every six months* She was allowed to recover
mental anguish flowing from the "cancero phobia." The
court realized its departure from previous precedent when
it remarked, "This case is s rcew ,at n.vel, of course, in
that it sppears to be the first caae in which a recovery
has been allowed against the wrongdoer for purely mental
suffering arising from information the plaintiff received
from the d- ctor to wh-ra she went f r treatment of the
original injury." 9 ** This case should not deter military
prsctltioners fr m giving complete inf rmstion to their
pstier ts ss it seems t ste d alone.
nuup
Consent t medical treatment obtained by fraud is
defective* The esse ra st often cited as precedent for
this rule is a case with a most unique and bizarre factual
9k
situation. The case is Hobbs v. £izcr . surgeon
prevailed upon a lady patient to engage in sexual inter-
course* whereup n she became pregnant. Upon breaking the
news t. the surgeon* he examined her and assured her that
she was mistaken nnd was real y suffering fr:,m an abscess
93. Id. at 21. 152 N.E.2d at 252.
;k. 236 Fed. 6'1 (Oth Gir. 1916).
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& - -. • 4am ! » njfciiti »Mft
it* SftAO
:•»*!; :e..n «M0
of the vagina* S; a la tar consented to "an operation. " and
ha took the opportunity to perform an abortion. She alleged
that the abortion was without her kn wledge or consent* The
court held that beoauae of the fraud the consent was defective
and the plaintiff could recover damages.
I
The am. unt of f roe r c. ercion that may lawfully be
employed in treating military patients is the subject of a
subsequent chip tor, however, the term coercion has gained
a olaoe in a general discussion f consent to medical
96
treatment because of the case of Keek v. City r.t Loveland .
Mr. > eek br u£ht action for ds agea against several city
of ieials as a result af having hia leg amputated against
his will by one of the defendants. The injury that led to
the emputati n was caused by a shot fired by a city p lice-
man whe mist- ok F eek f r a burglar. The court held that the
defendants should n; t be per- it ted to avoid liability where
the evidence revealed that ft eek had been taken b force
to the county poor farm (or h. soital); had been refused
a request tc be treated at a hospital f Lis own selection;
I had been operated on against his wil .
95. This rule is also expressed in the qu te from Knowles v.
Blue, supra page 29*





:A patient might willingly permit a touching by a
d etc r ad the doctor mi^ht administer skillful treatment,
where in fact the partial didn't have a meeting of the
minds as to what was taking place; consent of the patient
in such e situati I uld be defective if there was a
mistake.
97
In £iii v# •^•l^lPg > the defendant took a blood
sample from the plaintlfi a )d instructed her to return
to his office in five daya fcr a report. When the
plaintiff arrived fcr the report, she was confused with
another f the defendant's patient: and taken to the
operating ro:m where she was t- ld f "we are glng to
give you a test somethl g like a blood test. 1* The plain-
tiff thinking it was a continuation of the previous treat-
ment willingly got on the operating table. The defendant,
not realising who was on the table, made a spinal test by
inserting a hypodermic needle and withdrawing some spi al
fluid. The test was performed in a skillful manner. The
cc urt held that the consent was defective because of the
mistake.
r j?
As a general rule the consent f mine rs and Inc. tents
is defective because they lack the legal capacity to





consent. It hat already bee n ted that this rule is
inapplicable in emergencies,^ and it is concluded that
the rule concerning miners is inapplicable to minors
serving in the armed fcrces. 7
There are exceptions to the general rule stated ab ve.
Some courts have held that the consent »f a minor is
sufficient if he or she is mature enough to understand
the nature and imp rt of the contemplated treatment.
10
cey v. Laird , the court held that an eighteen year
old miner c uld consent tc a simple operation involvin
plastic surgery on her n se. In Gulf & Ship Isls d k... v«
-ulllvpn , a seventeen year old boy was held tc have had
the caprcity tc consent to "a very simple operation," I.e.,
a amallpcx vaccination, where it appeared that the by had
sufficient intelligence t kn w wl at he was doing* In
uka v. Lowrie, supra n te $S (minors)j
Pratt v. Davis, supra note 59 i incompetents)
.
>. disoussicn, with citation »f authority, of this
conclusion will be found in Chapter V, 1 fra .
100. 166 ohic St. 12, 139 N.~.2d 2$ (1956).





Bishop v, burly a * a nineteen year -Id boy e.fcered a
spital for a tonsillectomy and expired after a local
anaesthetic vas giver to him. His mother had specified
a genercl anaesthetic, but the boy on reaching the operating
ro m requested and was given a local. The court held the
boy's instructirns were n t defective; the ccurt reasoned
it since t e boy was legally qualified t contract for
medical services as one of the necessities f life, ha had
M e capacity to consent to the use - f local anaesthetic.
The appellate court in Bonner v. Morsn •* felt that
a fifteeo year eld bey had net readied the degree f
maturity tr. at would re der him capable of acting as
a v luntary bl od a .d skin donor for a plastic surgery
procedure with ut the consent f his parents. The court
must have been influenced by the fact that the operation
was f - r the berefit of another person, h..waver, it is
doubtful if this was the controlling factor as a fifteen
yeer old w uld have a hard time completely understanding
the * fiture and imp rt of such a procedure.
As a corollary to the rui t minors lack the
capacity to c.n ent is the rule that minors do not have
the cep^city t ^ive legally bine .natructi ns. In
102. 237 'ich. 76, ?1 . . 75 (1926).
103. 126 ?.2d 121 (P.O. Cir. 191^.1).
V*
JJS
Ollet v. Pit sburp., C. C t & St, L. fry. , ^ a seventeen year
old boy expressly stated he did n t want his foe t amputated
by anyone other thsn his own doctor. Fis foot had been
Injured by n trsln whose crew took him to a hospital. Whlli
in the hospital his foot was amputated by a strange doctor.
The court, In denying recovery against the defendant rail-
road, seemed to hinge its opinion on the emergency nature
of the operation; however, since the boy was conscious and
rational, it was n t an emergency as defined previously
in this dlsouBsl- n unless the boy was so immature that he
lacked the espacity to consent. The curt in effect stated
105
that the doctor was not bound by the b.y's instruct loos*
In view of t e foregoing hcldi , c;s, it appears t at
the practiti ner must acquire the eonser t of a parent or
rdlen of a nnmilitary minor bef.re he can rest assured
that the minor's consent la n t defective. If the minor
is fifteen years rid or Ider, then his consent snculd
sis; be acquired. There are no rep rted cases indicating
that the consent ef bet:; parents is required. If the
parents are legally separated or divorced, c.nent sheuld
be btained from the parent having lawful cuat dy of the
c lid. where the minor has a legal guardian, then the
ens at f the .-uardian would be required. If the miner
10U, 201 Pa. 361, 50 ltl« 1011 (1902).






does M t live with his parents and has n *rdian,
t: e s.aecne standing JLn 1 - oo parentis w uld hrve to consent,
.
, « close relative or heed of en institution in whleh
106
the minor lives*
The lew protects the parents' right to custody end
107
eontr: 1 t. eir children, ' consequently a very difficult
pr. tlem arises wren a r.ln r needs medical attention and the
parents refuse their c me: t, Some states have statutes
suth-rizing the Juvenile c urt t. order necessary raedic
ad surgical care in these cases, and many courts assert
Jurisdicti n over these situations on the theory that mln rs
109in need >f medical ore tine t are "negl :cted. tt me courts,
h wever, have been reluctant to verrlde the will e
parents. The courts appear to weigh the seriousness .
f
the c lid's condition against the danger of the peratl
in determining ohether to interfere.
106. PI* te k Shartel, The Law f KedlcQl Practice 25 (1959)
107. In re *r«nk, lj.1 Wash. 2d 29k, *%• _vJ .2d 553 (1952).
10 . .,-. . ich. r.tat. Ann. §27.317 (59*3.2) (h) (1) (1953).
109 « ' «/« » In re ; tkowit*, 175 ^isc. 9U8, 25 N.Y.S.2d
bZ\± (l^lTT People ex re] llace v. Labrenz,
I4.ll II
.
61', 10U ^.T2T769 (1952).
H°» • • » re rfnk, 1 te 107; In re Seiferth,
IST'N.TT Bo, 127 N.'.2d 20 (1955).






A military practitt oasr's best protection In treating
112
minora is a properly executed m $22 •
Inccnpctents
A person vtu is deemed in law tc be n^ n compos mc tis
does t hsve the cnpacity tc consent t medical treatment.
Ae in the case of miners, conee t by such a person vculd
be defective, cept 1 llitary patients end emergency
sltue.tir.na, the consent .. f the person standing in the
position .f guardian is sbs lutely required before treet-
111
ment ; e legally administered t' incompetents} ^
guardians include parents, sp uses, or th se legally
appointed t. act for the inc rape tent. If an adult patient
is n: t mentally deranged t. the extent that he is unable
11?. etsndard Form $2? t ut^jrizatlon for Administration of
eatfaesla and f r -Performance of peratluns and Other
"rcoeduros
.
Revised Jun \ "\e~ : fflci*l function
rf this form is stated t. be, "To obtain authorisation
f r the adal istratlon of ansstheels, th© performance
of operations or other pr cedures, and Lsposal
cf tissues or parts wh iy be rerr.ved. This form
is required f r dependents, Vetera , r other ncn-
active-duty military personnel but shall n used
f:r active-duty militar personnel. M ^Tereafter
cited as \ J
** £l£.» ratt v * *!•• 22U 111* 30 :, 7v (1906);
Pishworth v. H ss, \ \ 22$ (Tex.Com.App. 1920);
Lester v. etna Casualty rety Co., 6?6
(5th Gir. 1957); See also Army Heg. No. 1+0-3, para.





to understand the nature, purp.se, and risks incident I
a prep- sed treatment, he is n^t a nan c,rap„a mentis and
his consent vsuld n t be d-fective. ^
The problems :.f commitment, restraint, disposition,
and d' r inln thl M f competency of me tal patients
and all ;>r.blems dealing vith the criminally Insane are
beymd the scope ..f tills discussion.
Bach armed f rce has a directive glvla ores*
auth rity to perfrm "emergency" diagnostic measures,
treatment, or surgery upen military incompetents, ^
however, the m rd "emergency" is not defined. gain as
in the case of minors, a military practitioner's best
pr teetion in treating incompetents is a properly executed
Standard Perm 522.
llij-. Cf. 19 40- 3t para, 60 d.
11$, Army: ^ny Reg. He. pars. i|.8a (July 3, 3
^Tereafter cited ai AB 6C - '/' Lr Fore U. S. Pept,
of Air Perce, Ai: turn! .'-. . , Admlnis-
tratlcn 't edlcsl Treatment Activities, pare. k-3k-
(June i>6i; ^hereartt-r :ited as PT~T5g- : 5/;
l. r-er Io« 3» Navy Dept., para. 2d








A prrsn cannot give a valid consent tc an illegal
act, consequently uch consent Is defective* Some states
have statutes making it a crime for physicians to sterilize
normal persons for any reason other than a therapeutic
116
necessity and all states have statutes making non-
117
therapeutic abortions 11 egal. Consent by the patient
to any of these eot8 would n t be a del e t the physician
or sur,-e n, but some Jurisdicti ns h Id that these
operations, being m ral y and legally wrong, may not be
the basis of a civil action bv either the surgeon or
the patient.
The ' svy specifically forbids experimental studies
of a medical -'ture on members of the naval establishment
116. E.g. , Conn. Gen. t->.t. nn., tit. 53 $33 U95&).
117 • 'b rtions are also an offense under rt. 13U»
Uniform Code of military Justice (10 0. .0. 1934)
(195-) /hereafter cited as J7; united States
v. vo dard. 17 01 3 (1954).
118. g,g. . Hancock v. Hullett, 203 Ala. 272, . $ZZ
TT9T9).
11 ••
*f*f Sxsdiwics v. .tor, 257 ; ass. $16, 154 *• •01 (1926); rater v. wheaton, 53 £06.









without prior approval of the Secretary of the Navy*
Accordingly, consent without the approval of the secretary
would be defective. The author has been unable to locate
any state statutes on the subject of patient experimentation
121but any forced experiments wr-uld undoubtedly be illegal.
Reasonable medical experiments performed with the consent




Marriage d es not affect the capacity to consent.
pers n who la man led and otherwise competent does not
have to get the consent ef their spuse in -rder to receive
medical treatment. This rule applies equally between
husbands and wives and extends to all types of treatment
and operations. In K senberg v. Feijrln , 2 3 the wife
120. U.S. Dept. f «vy, nual dical Department,
art. 1-11 (1952).
121. See 2 Trials f War ri ofere the Juremburg
illtary Tribunals 1 1- c. ( 19li-7) (Medical case).
122. Per a good discussion i the problem of "experimentation
see :'eC id, The C:.re ftoqulred : f : edlcal i-ractitl.ners ,
12 Vend. L. "T*- , 5ol (195 0. For a god dis-
cussion of the case law on the sssia subject see
ith, .. cedent Grounds f liability in the Practice
of surgery , Ik V, cky : t. L. : .^v. 23,;., 206 -2/3 U9U2).






mill . • i
j
Al hv
consented to treatment that resulted In a nitcarriage. The
husfc^nc sued the defe dent dcct r a
failure t gat his consent am unted tc r • . ie
:* Id that the consent ,f the wife si tie '-as
In Krltzer v. Cltrcn, ie
die capacity tc c an operation Ml
her incapable of further childbesriv. .




NMR AHD . IC MILITARY
The foregoing discussion represents the general law
regarding consent t medical treatment. It is the purpose
the remainder of this discussion to focus attention
upon certain problems erested when an attempt is made to
spnly the foregoing rules to a situation where a military
patient dcesn't desire medical attention.
ost servicemen are mere than eager tc receive all
t e medical assistance tc which they are entitled as
me bers of the armed forces, and consent tc treatment is
never mentioned as it la simply Implied from the circum-
stances. In these routine situation the military
practitioner is guided by the general rules of c nsent.
-ever, a very real medic: -r.i 11 tary- legal problest" arises
w en a servicemen does n t exhibit such an eagerness and
aba lutely refuses t: per ny medical, dental or surgical
oedure tc be performed upon him. It is a pr blem f r
the service practitl ner as he d.esn't want t ^ewae
invc lved In either a civil :r criminal malpractice act!
that w uld damage his professional standi n both as a
d ct^ r and as an officer. It is a pr: blem for the military
eossssnder as he is responsible for the tilscipli e, welfare
and n rale of those serving under his cor . The law
51
*-
, .. » yf,.,. >» > :> If
m* «
Vftl MiT
is put t ii severe test as it must strike a I ee between
the pers.na'l ri hta f the ^tlcnt needs . f 6
military, while st the same time guidl teeting
these with c;ra»and responsibilities.
The Congress en^ the Pri t have aever expressly
led their views on the amount of f rce that c
used to treat or operate upon, without
,
those subject to military at 1.
result, the armta f - rces have been left tc purs* lr
own courses en tb* se uncharted waters.
The positions t*iK« e arpv rces and 1
writers en the subjret under ^iscussin are set forth
in this chapter; h wever, the views, ccnclusl
recommendations of the r are leaated in the. final
pter cf the text.
The Fllitwry o sit ton
There is no sin le military posit
I
nmed
ce has he , - . seek its cwn . . iion to the
e word "surgery 11 is used in the remainder is
study to mean sn operation where i ;<eisi-.




The j -vy is the only firmed f ree thet has a definite
p licy with regard to all forced surgery. This policy
applies both in time of war and time of peace and reads
as f;llows! "As a matter of policy, surgery shall n; t
be perf-rmed on a person over his protest if he is mentally
c mpttent. This d es n. t mean that he should not be
subjected to disciplinary action f r refusal to submit t:
126
surgery if his refusal is determined t be unressc: nable."
The Amy , except for emergency surgery on psycho tics,
hsve a definite p licy relating to f reed surgery
set f rth in its basic directive. The Army's gener
personnel regulation pr.vides for a board procedure and
disciplinary action when a man refuses surgical treatment
but is c r.pletely silent on whether the recommended
surgery can be performed by force. ' The Ar,y is presently
considering a change to its regulation that v old clarify
its p sition. A i jed draft res* s in nart as fellows:
Ijo • I edical C re. £. General . A member f the rmy
ctive duty or acoive duty for training ntnnllj
wil be required to submit t medical care c nsidered
necessary to protect r maintain the health of
others, tc preserve the member's life, or to
126. 3en. Order No. 3, avy Dept., para. 7«









prevent or al eviate undue suffering by the member.
b. fedtcal care, as used in this paragraph
means""preventive, diagnostic, therapeutic aaa*
rehar ilitative medic el, urgical, psychiatric and
dental procedures
•
£. ider the following circumstances medical
care may be performed with . r w 11ho u t t tie m emb er ' s
.) Fmer^enoy medical care which is
required to preserve the life or
health of the member.
(2) edical care that is eeessary t
protect the life or health -;f a
member who has been declared by a
qualified psychiatrist to be mental y
incompetent.
(3) Routine medical pare f . r minor ,r
temporary disabilities"! I I , A^o
The Jud^e dvocate General of the Army appears to have
traditi nally taken a position sanctioning the use of
f rce where a serviceman refuses recommended surgery,
h wever. the pinions n the subject seem to nave pur-
posely avoided being concise.^
T*1C ^lr Force has a aefi polity only with regard
to f red surgery in emergencies; it rends as follows?
1< . For s discussion of the background and b comple




s.g. . J 19 1/2300 (Kar, 16, 1951);
T55IA171 (Jul. 10, 1951 ) S 19S5/B356
( ct. 2\±$ 1955). chiller, illtary Law , p. 91}.
U952) for s 1918 opinion.
5k




"Vhen emergency treatment, rurgery, :r diagnostic procedure
Is required t rfe the life r health of the patient,
it may be performed with or without his permission. The
aame is true when a diagnostic procedure cr treatment is
necessary to protect the life of health of a patient who
has been declared by a qualified psychiatrist t oe mentally
incompetent." 1™ The Ail rce then it the only arm.
force with a defini- icy sanetloalnj use of some
f reed surgery.
Toe rlters* Foaitlcn
This author >?as nly able to locate writers who take
the unqualified position tl at force is always auti d
n a serviceman refuses recox ended surgery. ne autr
phrased toe nation and gave his aoowr as followsi
»• a person in the military service possess
the right stated in the Pratt case, "the right
to the inviolability of his person, the rijit
himself? he be perated upon without his
co sent?
To reach a 1 rlc?:l as well as a legal answer
to these questi ns, asic duty of military
personnel must be be me in mind. very soldier,
sailor, fiirraan d msrin a duty to r>-«?iintBln
i elf in the best possible physical condition
to perf - rm oho military tasks that are required
I him, vherher in the preparation for the defense,
or in the actual defense of the united bates.
Diagnosis a d corps cuive medical treatment play
importr t part in Balnl military manpower
at the proper efficient level. If a servicer
were permitted t .ecide for himself that
130. : 160-20, para. k-3k*
55
•
v uld Ret : r,ve a needed operoiion and thereby
make him elf unavailable fc r military duty, the
ability cf tfcu rricd trvlces to nuuntpin military
strength at peak efficiency would be seriously
impaired. nus, in the case ..f military personnel ,
the rule is tha t c nsent is n t necessary In order
To pt rf . m pi: : per ^ tier. ,^ 31
The abeve euth r left nc doubt as to what he meant by
the word operation at he quoted the following definition
from the third edition of Blsck* s Law lie tic nary :
j. leal practice, the term is of indefinite
import, but ma r ximately defined as an
act r successi n of acta performed upon the body
of a pf tie t, for his relief or restoration
normal co citiens, either by manipulation
or the use f surgical instruments or be th,
at dlstir.;.'ui hed from therapeutic treatment
by the administrati n of drugs or other remedial
a encies.132
ther writer, in summing up the except!, ns t the
general rule that consent must precede surgical trent-
ment, stated:
An exception to toe consent rule is founded
on emergencies. . . .
ther exception is founded n military
expediency. ry officer e men has a duty
to ".self in the best p-ssibie physical
condition t- perf r his milit?iry duties. Thus
in the case of milit ^racnnel, consent cf
the patient is unnecessary in order for a military
131. : archus, edl csl ; plprpctlce, Hospital Ne, l i ,0 ce
. d the rmed~; eryices at 6-69 iKay 19371
(unpublished thesis presented to The Jud> Advocate




medical surgeon to perf rm en operation on hiau
Nevertheless, whenever p^isible It would appt
be the most prudent practice tc obtain written
consent frum the patient, be he military or
civill n.133
Universal : j lllt^ry Training and -.crvlee \ct ™
It la felt that thia 8tudy would be incomplete
without a ecnsldersti n of the treatment given t
re Istra* ta under the Univeraal Military Training and
Service *ct whc have remediable physical efects.
The act provides ti at, "the President la alar, auth riet ri,
under auch rules ind regulations as he may prescribe,
to ?r vide for the deferment fyoa trelnlng trnd. servi
in the rmed Forces • . • . f any or all categories
of these persons found tc be physically, r^entfilly, or
morally defioient or defective." ** ursuant to thia
auth-.rlty the resident b ex. cutive order has aet
forth a list of "disqualifying obvious defects and
. 136
manifest conditions":
The existence of one or more of the obvioua r
defects r manifest conditions contained in
the f lie wine alphabetical liat shsll disqualify
133« Rakestrww, slpractlce ?nd the v.llltery Doctor,
0. ?. Air Force J ull., Mcv. 1961, p. 7.
1314.. $0 u. . . 81^51-73 (191+6).
135. $0 I, . . §U56(h)
136, <2 C.?.R. Il6?9.1 (1962),
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a registrant f r a rvice In tr:e armed forces if
the functional ability of the registrant 1
impaired t. tr.e extent that he cann. t perform
military duties in n satisfactory manner:
/The tw.. page list i - duces sucn defects as a
type of inguinal hernia, several types -f
turn rs, and certain weight conditions^
Those wh are obviously unfit for military duty
due t physical defects are classified "IV-F" by
their local draft b ^rd; all :,th' rs, unless they are
qualified for an exemption, are ordered tc an armed
forces examining statin for ? c. raplete physical exar -
inatio'. T pc n disc very f on aforementioned "dis-
qualifying obvious defect, etc." t..e person is rejected;
fever, if he has only a temp rary defect he is dealt
with se f . 1 ows:
For registrants disqualified f • r defects that are
temp: rary, such as remediable defects, . . . an
appr' priate c b% will be entered . . . £pn certain
forms/ t indicate t' at a reexamination may be
justif led at a later date. It is the prer: gative
and resp nsibility of ive Service 1 cal
b.nrtis kc determine if s-ch Individuals g oulc
be returned fo» a £ I examin r-ticnj therefore,
the c;ia ent /Ey the army examiners/ will not , ^«
recommend, request, or suggest such action . • . .
Tt clerrly appers from tie above tr. t the present policy
is not t accept persons with remediable defects with a
view toward h^vir; military correct tnem either
willingly or by f^rce. r>lnce ed c n-
cerning treatment when he rep.rts tack to his locnl boord,
137. Amy Reg. lo. 601-270, para. 6Q( cKi+MSept. 12, 1962).
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presumably he Is under no duty or obligation t remedy
tile defect end doesn't have to worry about military
service as 1 ng as he retains the defect.
v
: : . "KTAL v .:; ..
The term "medical treatment" does mt ordinarily
lnolude "surgery" within its meaning* It must be ccn-
138
oludcd from the plain language of their basic directives
that the armed fcross give "surgery" a meaning apart
from the term "medical treatment*" e.g., the ray's
directive is entitled "Refusal of mediosl, surgical,
r dental treatment"; the Navy's is entitled,
"Disposition Cf -aval Personnel Who Refuse Medical,
Dental Or l ur. ical Treatment . • ."; and the ' ir Force
in the text of its directive states, "a medical berd
will examine any person in the military service wh
refuses t submit t^ medical treatment, • urgical operation,
or diagnostic treatment."
Medical treatment wili be uaed in this discussion
t mean all steps, excluding surgery and tranafusi ns,
teken to effect a cure »f an injury or disease, in-
cluding examination ts4 diagnosis as wel . as application
138* These directives are set forth in n te H5« supra .
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of remedies. Dental treatment could be defined in the
same manner by simply limiting the scope of the cure
to the teeth; therefore, dental treatment will be treated
ss a part cf the breeder terra medical treatrae t«
The llltery Position
The President by executive crder has set forth
the duties f the medical officer as follows i
It is the duty if medical i fficers t- attend
sick members of the erred f rces, t make
periodical physical examinations as required
by regulations and to examine persons for
enlistment, and medical officers may be specially
directed t; observe, examine, or attend a member
of the armed f rces. uch observation, examination,
or attendance would be official ... .^39
The ??svy expressly sanctions the following measures
"with ut the consent snd over the protest of the individual
concerned":
(a) dmlnister auth rifted immunisation
and prophylactic measures for the prevention of
disease
(b) Proceed with routine diagnostic measures
and other special tests and examinations except
in th se oases where f r any reason the pr eedure
would entsil unreasonable risk of injury or by
its nature be difficult f performance wit* cut
the patient's voluntary c© peration. The practice
temp la ted may he Illustrated by the examples
noted below.
( Compulsion permissible—examples ; Kahn and
Bogen tests, *r"."---ry ' '-rays, dermal reaction tests,
lumbar puncture, taps of body fluids, catheterization,
139. •« s. Dept. f efense, I nual for Courts- ^rtial
United 3tates 1951- P»r«. l5lc(2). /hereinafter
cited as M<3 , 1>S1/.
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eleetrvencephal <:raphy, ordinary physical
examination, eic).
( Cwpulal'-n not p t rr ls alble"-examplcs>
Exploratory surgery, surgical biopsy, intro-
duction of lipiod 1 into spinal cenal, bronchoscopy,
cystoscopy, ventricul y, presence of sub-
stantial contreindica tions arising from idiosyncrasy
or poor condition f pctieno, etc.).
Refus 1 f these measures may, h; wever, be
unreas nable under the testa specified in paragraph
5 and so constitute a breach of discipline.
(c) Administer usual and customary medical
or dental treatment f r c ntaglous r cair unicable
diseases.
(d) Perform emergency surgery necessary
to protect health or life if the patie t is me ntal
incompete t from psychiatric causes or from the
efects f his disease r c ndition. 1^-
The Any dees n: t hsve e stated policy in its basic
directive regarding forced medical treatment, however, its
basic t tractive does provide that, "immunizations that
conform to established medical practice nay be administered
forcibly to these refusing same. . . . nl<*1
The Air Force in ita basic directive authorizes
f reed "emergency treatment," h wever, this term is I
defined and nothing is mentioned c ncernin ; the use -f
force in performing routine treatment or cnductlng
r utlne physical examinations.
H4.O. General Order No. 3» Navy Dept., para. 2.
1U1. ap 600-20, pars. U b.




Each firmed force takes the petition ttat refusal
to obey an order to submit to reasonable surgery or
medical treatment Is a court-mart1*1 offense* Xotice
has slready been taken of the fact that there are
reported c urts-martlal for this offense since the
adoption of the Wmitmtm Cede f T ilitar Justice,
however, trials did occur prior t the ad; pti n of ?he
present ccde.^^*
' aoh armed force requires tr at th se who refuse
treatment, surgery, or physical examination must appear
before a medical board before tr ey can be tried by
court-martial. In the Army and Air Force the board
must answer the following questions In the affirmative
before trial by court-martial Is considered appropriate:
1) D es the patient need the treatment In order to
properly perform his military duties? 2) Can the
treatment normally be expected to pr duee the de?ired
results? The Navy requires Its boards to answer similar
lij.3* All references I llclcs sod pr cedures In
Mm fol owing paragraphs are taken from the basic
directive of each armed force on the subject f
refusal tc consent t medical treatment. These
directives are set forth in note 115* supra .






inquiries and demands answers t. the f llowing additional
»sti na before a trial for refusing surgery is considered
appropriate: 1) Is the prop sed surgery an established
procedure that qualified and experienced surge. ns would
ordinarily recommend and undertake? 2) Considering the
risks ordinarily associated with surgical treatment, the
patient's age ad general physical c.ndlti n, and his
reasons f - r refusing treatment, is the refusal reasonable
or unrcps'. nable?
The nty and Navy require review of the bcard*s
findings by higher auth rity before a c urt-martial
can be ordered; the position of the Air Force concerning
review by higher auth rity cann t be determined fron its
directive.
The present I a ual f r Courta-tfartial has a sample
specification under the charge if rticle 92, Uniform
Code f littery Justice relating to "failure ey
lawful order to submit t. certain medical treatment, "^h-5
conaequently auch an ffense t day would be charged under
that article*







It beh ovea military medical practitioners
fully understand the legal requirement* of consent, as
fsllure to observe these requirements might be grounds
f r crl~insl prosecution or a civil suit fcr damages*
Those in command, because of their overall responsibility,
should likewise be farailirr with these requirement .
Therefore, these requirements should be set f c rth in
regulations that are easily understandable and readily
available.
The ordinary doctor-patient relationship remains
unchanged between a service doctor and a dependent patient,
h wever, certain sspeets of this relationship are changed
by having the patie t subject t- military authority and
contr 1. For purposes f m rale, llitary patients
sh-.uld generally be accorded all c sensual rights and
privileges of ordlnr.ry petients, notwithstanding any
change in the doctor-patle:>t relationship and the fact
that certain treatment could be legally ^ive t them
without their consent.
nny disagreements could be prevented by acquiring
express consent from petients rather tt an relying on





favor : f gettin* express c nsent.
.though oral consent 1b Juat as legally binding as
written consent, written consent Is preferred In al oases
where there la any danger tc list life, health, or well-
being of the patie t.
A uniform regulation applicable to 811 the ;r. ed
f reel shculd be promulgated describing when and hew
written consent sh:uld be acquired from th.se being
treated by service prnctltl ners. Paragraph (5) > 'nay
Regulations ^0-3 (March 26, 1962) ^ is recommended as a
W rking m del. The following changes are proposed to this
working m: delt
First: All t e provisiona except sections i»)(l)
(2)( j) a d (b)(7)(8) sh- uld be made applicable to military
pa well aa nnmllitary pp.tients.
Second: Section (d) should incorporate the deflniti n
"emergency" set forth in Chapter II, supra end Impose
e duty on military practitioners tc render treatment in all
emerge- cy esses except th ae discussed in the fallowing
.".grs,
Third: The last line of the present secti i)
sn uld be changed tc read as follows: iere parents,
guardians, or legal repre tives are reasonably





available but object t necessary treatment of mental
Incompetents or nonmilitary miners, such treatment will be
withheld pending notification of and instructions from the
proper civilian authorities. Contact with the oivili
authorities will be established in the most possible
expeditious me una. n This change is only proposed as an
interim measure, as it is recommended that a detailed
study be made t. determine if federal legislation is
needed or desired, under these circumstances, to better
tect toe rights and intt r< sts f th se that would be
involved.
Fourth: I paragraph sh.uld be added t section (a)
Lmtlmf out that military miners ere emancipated to the
extent that their consent is legally binding without the
oonsent f their parents, although there are no statutes
or rep ned oaaes directly in point, it has long been
established that a minor serving in the armed forces
becomes emancipated fr.m the control of his parents for
many other purp-ies. ^ In the leading case n point,
lk7. See, e.g. , 39 Am. Jur. Parent & Child , %6k U9ij.2).
srehus, supra note 131 at 71-72 shares the view
of the author that consent of a military minor,






the : uprerae Court expressed the view that:
Enlistment Is mere than a contract; It effects
a change of status. It operates to §atn«lp*t«
minors at least to the extent that by enlistment
they become bcund to serve subject to rules
vernlnf enlisted men and entitled t have and
freely to dlsp se of their pay. Upon enlistment
of plalntif 's son ... he became entirely subject
t the control of the United States In respect of
all things pertaining to :r affecting his service. *+u
^ndard Form 5^2 needs amending In order to Insure
an "Informed" c nsent. The practitioner should be re-
quired to Indicate over his signature thet he has
counseled the patient ••Mamlftf the nature, risks,
and expected results of the conte plated procedures;
s space should be orcvlded on the f :rm for this nurpose.
This would eliminate the necessity for "annotating" the
form as preae tly required by the -'my, Th* formf
or the regulations governing its use, should make it
tlesr that In deciding If a specific disclosure Is
required to insure an Informed consent, the military
practitioner should rely on the practice followed in the
general military co munity rather than on the practice
114.3. United States v. 11 ie~s, 30* . . M>, 14.9-50
IJT).
1U9. .,0-3, pare. 5b.
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150fallowed in the local civilian community, '
' uniform regulation applicable to all the armed
f. rcea should be promulgated setting forth all illegal
treatment and operations and all treatment and operations
prohibited by federal policy. This regulation ohould
not be made dependent upon the various conflicting state
laws and should apply throughout the worldwide military
•oucunity. I detailed study fib aid be made to determine
the extent to which the subjects cf experimentation,
birth centre 1, contraception, and sterilisation ihott]
be incorporated into such a regulation; t e study sh uld
treat such cuesti ns as the extent to which fe.:er--l
medioal facilities and doet rs can be utilized in
perf rmlmg vaaectcmies or other sterilization ; r cedures
on both males *-d females who are on cctive duty or in
a dependent status*
The directives - f the armed forces discussed in
Chapter IV of this study are inadequate otect the
1^0. The fundamental resin fof this recommendation stems
from the fact that acceptance of the 1 cal civilian
c mmunity standard would result in unacceptable
variances throughout the military medic: 1 •atablisa-
ment. This was rs .zed In itoleaar v. United es,
19 • m, 517, 521 . .Fl»« .961) where the court
stated, "such t»n institution £& military hospital/
is a community apart p.nd cannot be ssid to hove
contributed nothing t the standards of its geographical
1 cation or unt~ itself. H This lama view Is shared







rights of those in the military whc refuse recommended
surgery.
Is the contention f this auth r, notwithstanding
the authorities cited In Chapter IV, supra , that the
patient's aforementioned richt to "the invi lability
f hlc pevf.n" is nrctfetec by articles I and V of the
Bill ts, rnd this right extends t the serviceman
tc the extent that in time of peaee surgery tea n t be
151
fcroed up- n him without hia consent. The rights of
the Individual si*nly outweigh any milit> ry necessity*
This contention ala- leads t the conclusion that any
peacetime order to submit to unwanted surgery wculd I
unlawful, as It would got be "reasonably necessary to
saf' 1 and protect the morale, discipline and usefulness
15l» The fact that a aervioeman is protected by the
111 of its c n L or b« dleouted; see,
p.k. . Burns v. lis n, 3U6 . . 137' (1953).
liof reassurra ce of this fact,
backed by liberal citation of authority, see
rren, mi/.f Fights and the llltary,
37 N.Y.uJ: .Rev. 16 (1962) and Quinn, The '
Vnited rtates Court > f' llltary Appeals





of the members" of the armed forces*
It is not eug c £-sted that the patient's ri i:ht to
I invl Lo person" Is absolo .
plfice, si d circumstance must all be taken into account.
. r r^ve nsti rial emergency may justify an exercise
of suth rity effecting individual rights which are
intolerable in time f peace. If this country were
feced with a crisis where r; military manpower
were crucial t: safeguard its very existerct
*
f rce w uld bs authorised to perf.rm remedial sur ery
orders to submit to such surgery w uld likewise be
liwful; wever, in order to insure "due pr cess"
the followl
r
L4 have to be affirmatively sh:. writ
1) the surgery wss requlr relieve s condition t]
vented the perf rra-.rce f military duties; 2) it
The Court of M ilitary Appeals in United »i v.
Hertin, 1 a b7k$ 676. 5 Cr R 102. 10k, UlS^i
formulated the following as s test for determini
the lawfulness f en or ert "All activities v
are rea Ly necessary to safeguard and or tect
the morale, discipline SttA usefulness .ae
embers f a command si directly connected
with the maintenance of &-. d
services are subject rise c ntr 1
upon whom the respc sibi.ity of d rests.
% It has already been pointed out that
bt t use f'.rc*..
protection f ill. >ee, e.g. . ases
cited in n tee f»l 9, supra .
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was expected to be successful; 3) it was an established
procedure that qualified and experienced sur. eons would
ordinarily recommend and undertake; and k) it would r
unduly endanger the life - f the oatient. When maximum
military manp-wer bee mes this crucial, a national program
ahculd be established permitting remedial surgery on al
citizens eligible for military service. This would be
s proper subject for coverage by the Universal I*ilit«ry
Training end Service Act,
Physical examinations *»nd v. utine medics! treatment
fall into a different category than surgery, consequently
orders to submit to the former sre lawful as they are
reasonably necessary to safeguard and protect the morale,
15kdiscipline and usefulness of the members of 8 eorar.snd. "^
ch orders are lawful, It necessarily follows that
reasonable force could be r^lyed in order to see tfc
such orders are carried into effect;, w* However, any
force 'poll d in such a anner thst wr, uld be shoekJ
t the conscience of an ordinary person would violate
the due process provision of the Co stltuti. n, v
15'
. See Unit ,<*tes v. Baker, 11 313, 29
TTT (1)60),
155. Gt. 'C , 1951, paras. 150b, 151c(2).
156. Cf. Jolted Itates v. Rochin, %Z .. . 165 (1952);
TTnlted States v, Williamson, i >, l>




A uniform regulation applicable tc all the armed
f; rces should be promulgated in order tc insure that
the basic rights are accorded these refusing medical
and surgical treatment. The regulation should establish
uniform procedures to be followed a d sh uld set forth
clear examples of situations where f- rce would be
auth rized and examples of those situations where force
would not be suthorl§#4« Fuch a regulation should outlaw
ft reed surgery, at least until a national pro ram is
established on the subject, and should pr vide for the
discharge, with limited benefits, of that refusing
remedial suroery. The regulation should provide for
administrative as well as substantive due process in its
lf>7procedures. The Navy ;;epartment' s General order No. 3»
with few except! ns, fulfills all f these requirements
9 is recom e-.ded as s w rking model. The only r* commended
major change tc this working nr del, other than a change
In the language to include the other armed forces, would
be to remove all refere ces permitting disciplinary actl n
for refusing recommended surgery and insert a provision
expressly prohibiting discl^ inary action in such cases.
eaical and surgical treatment are considered as
sijt fringe benefits by most servicemen. 11 possible









care ah ulri be takea to keep such treatment in the benefit
category rather then •king possible military medical
treatment a thin.; t be feared. Tc tie maximum extent
possible, a military patient should be lo.ked upon as




ARKY F No. 1^0-3. 'ICAL S KVIC - SDICaL,
l , I D RY C , $f ( . 26, 1962)
5. - i :>HNT . a, v.btalnin^ c. nsent .
ned consent f • r the performance of certain diagnostic and
therapeutic procedures and under certain other circumsu? .ces
must be btsined from n: nmllitary patients (both inpatients
and outpatients). The consent required toy this pal ph
should not be confused with the general implied c. nsent pro-
cedures incide t li Admitting a h.spital patient. Incept
•s provided below, the patie- t sh uld personally si n he
consent which will be recrded on SP $2.2 (Clinical Hecord -
uthorifcation for Administration of nesthesia and for
erform?nce of operations and Other Procedures),
(1) If the ncnmilitary patient is unmarri d aid
under the age of 21, consent will ordinarily
be obtained from the patient's parents cr
guardian,
(2) If the patie t covered in (1) above is able
to understand ond comprehend fully the
significance if the procedures contemplated,
it is also desirable that the patient's c. nse t
be obtained*
( 3) In any circumstances in which the securing of
parental consent is considered unnecessary in
view ,.f the age, mental oooditi n, and
emancipated status of the patient, nonavail-
ability of the parents, a d similar factors,
the advice of the local staff Judge advocate
or other legal ffleer should be sought.
(U) When a Judlciai deter instion of mental
incompetency has been made, consent mast be
obtained from the individual appc Inted by
the court to act for the incompetent patient,
(5) When the question f ment -1 competency arises
•nd a judicial deter ination of mertal
c Tipetency has n t been made, the question
of r th rity to c: nsent will be referred to






(6) When • patient for some other reason is unable
to respond, the consent of the spouse or next
of kin must be obtained. In the event that
the spouse or next of kin cannot be contacted,
the question of authority to consent will be
referred to the appropriate judge adv. c ate or
legal adviser f r .vice,
b. Counseling required . The physician or dentist \
is to perf rm or supervise the performance of a ccnt> oed
procedure will counsel the patient and/or the consenting
individual. odlng will include an explanation of
nature and expected results of the contemplated
procedure. The physician or dentist will annotate BF 522
to indicate that the patiert and/or the consenting
Individual wss so ecu seled.
c. Procedures or circumstance s which require consent .
The procedures r circumstnnces which require special
sent are--
(1) All raaj r and miner surgery wt lch involves
an entry into the body, either through
an incision or through one of the natural
b- dy c penin^.s.
(2) Any procedure or course of treatment in
which anesthesia is used, whether an entry
into the body is involved or net.
( 3) All non operative procedures which involve
more then a sllf^ht risk or harm to the
patient, or which involve the risk of a change
in the patient's b.dy structure.
(I4.) All procedures where roentgen ray, radium,
or other radioactive substance la used in
the treatment f the patient*
(5) roced-;res w lch Involve eleotr :-
shook or insulin coma therapy.
(6) All ether procedures which In the c pinion of
the attendin, physician or dentist, the c:ief
of service, or the commander require a special
consent. ,? ny questl n es tx the necessity f
9 special consent from a patie t




(7) Admission of patients with psyche tic disorders.
(8) Admission f pstients tc closed wards.
d. Conact t In emer. encies . In an emergency of any
nature, which Is a serious » nd Imminent threat to the
life, health, or well-being of a patient, and time does
n t permit obtaining the required conse , sic!
may proceed with whatever reeaures are necessary and
required. However, if the patient is a nonmilitory
minor, whose parents must consent t. non-emergency
treatment under the rules set forth in a(l), and 12),
and ( 3) above, treatment will not be given over the
parents 1 expressed r implied objecti n ev.n in emergency
c nditi ns.
•• Cental procedures . Consent f r dent 1 r cedures
which c.me under the previsions f c(l) and
may be obtained at the time a course of treatment is
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1. ? embers of the nav,°l service who refuse t submit
edloeli dental, r surgical measures necessary t- keep
ther fit to % rm their duties shall be handled in accord-
a.ee with the following directions,
2. The senior medir tflaer f i hip r statLn,
after consultation with other medical or dental f: leers,
if available, er.c with the rpprovnl cl the comrcandin^ officer,
shall, where in hia judgment the best interests of ti
individual cr of the service require, t»Jce the f .". ig
m*e:ures without the e. nsent era ver the protest ef the
individual c ncernedt
(s) Administer auth*. rlsod immunization '.nd
prophylactic f enures f r the prove ti:n 1 cl-ense.
(b) } roceed witi. routine dicgno, stic eesures
ther special tests a:.d examinations except in
th.se enses where for any reason the procedure wc.uld
entail unreasonable risk or injury or fcj 111 nature
be difficult of performance without the patient**
v. luntary c operation, oractice cent*
may be illustrated by the examples n.ted below.
( Compulsion per iaslble-^ej: t&n an n
tests, ordinary X-rays, dermal reaction tests, lumbar
puncture, tfps of b dy fluids, cfithete.rlzst : on,
electroencephalography, ordinary physical exarat a,
etc. )
.
(Compulsion not oer* lsslble—examples? x iloratory
surgery, surgical bi ,psy, intr dnetlon of Lipi
Into spinal canal, bronchoscopy, cystoscopy, ventriculography,
ce f substantial aontraindlaati ns arising fr
i i syncrasy or poor condition f p tier t, etc. .
Refusal of these measures may, however, be unreason-
able under the tests specified in paragraph 5 and to
nstitute a breach . f discipline.
.
c) Administer usual and cust mary medical r
de tal treatme t f • r con. js or communicable diseases.
(d) rsrform emergency surgery necessary t pr tect
health cr lift* if the patier.t is mentally 1 c mpetsnt
from psych Lo causes or from the effee f his
disease r condition.
3. Pers ns who unreas nably refuse routine medical,






disabilities shall oe reported to the c mmanding c fficer
for disciplinary action. This Is Intended «ae
©or. oases Involving 11 trie or no risk tc t cient
idle re It la Inexpedient MM unnecessary to transfer the
patient tc a nevtl hospital* The senior medical officer,
in determining whether the patient* s refusal f the pr oedure
Is unreasonable, shall do so after consultation with other
nodical r dental officers, if available, and after due
c nsldoreti n f the nan's condition, his reasons f .. r refusal
and such tests as th se Indicated in paragraph 5. Sncelel
cases naff if considered desirable, be reported t: the Bureau
of Naval Personnel or Ckrmandc.nt, United States .ne Corps,
via the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, for further Instruct! as.
i|« Hembers cf the naval service Mhc refuse to submit
t41eelf dental, or surgical procedures shall, vith the
exceptions n; ted in psrsgraphs 2 and 3» be transferred
s navsl Ltal for further observation and disposition.
5« Patients trans ferred t- a naval hospital in
ec- ce with these instruct irns shall, foil wing their
arrival at the hospital, be brou^t bef re a Sosrd of
edl irvey eonsistin f a t less than three nodical
officers Mho shall study the case, inquire into the merits
f th< individual's refusal to submit to treatment and
rep rt the facts with their reco-aarendation tc t reau
f IV nel, or ndant. United States Marine
rpa, via the ureau of v ediclne and iurgery.
(a) In ; urglcal cases, the Board's rep- rt should
contain the answers tc the following qu ttlonti
(1) Is surgical trer.tmrnt required to relieve
the incapacity ?nd restore the individual to duty st tus
a d ma it be expected t do a ?
(2) Is the proposed surgery en established
procedure that qualified and experienced surr.ee ns
woul ly reoemmend and undert&ke?
(3) C nsidering the risks ordinarily ass cifcted
with surgical treatment, the patient's age :*nd genei
physical condition, tn4 his reasons for refusln;;
tre^tment, is the refusal reasonable r unre
ere fear of ourgery or religious scruples in such
eases are n t t e c nsidered.
(b) If toe individual concerned has refused a
medical , dental , or dlagn stlc measure the bc&rd of
: edlcpl ' urvey fh.uld answer similar inquiries desi
to show need a <d risk of . r cecure.
6. /-s a general rule, refusal iaor surgery
should be considered as unreas nable in the absence
substantial contrai odlc< ses of major surgery
require most careful Individual apL ©fusal
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such operations may be reasonable or unreasonable,
accord! the circumstances of the particular case.
In uch cases, the age of the patient, any existir>
physical contraindications, previous unsuccessful
operations, end any sp=del risks should be taken into
consideration.
7« 'e a matter of policy, surgery shall not be
performed oa a person over .-.test if he is me tally
.pete. t. This does net mean that he should not be
subjected to disciplinary action f-r refusal t submit
t put; cry If his refusal 1e determined to be unrest;. ruble.
If f edlc e.l urvey decides that a
diagnostic, medical, di , or surgical pr-
c
is
indicated, these findings must be made known to the patient
end the Be ard' o report shall shew thf<t he was aff : rded
en c ;nity t submit a written statement explaining
the gr unds for his ref ] , If ,uch c iti nt Is
submitted, it shall he f . warded with ohe Board's
rep . The patient should be advised by the it
this time that his continued refusal may leed z..
disciplinary ection. Ivan if his disability originally
erose in line of duty, its continuance w uld be attributable
to his unreas. nable refusal fee cooperate in its correction.
The ec ntinuarce of the disability should, therefore, be
crjsliered as due to the individual's own misconduct and
as "n- t In line of duty" fr:m and after the time of nis
unrer rable refusal.
9. If, after review by the bureaus ffices
c-ncerned, it is concluded that * Lvletaal'a refusal
is unreasonable, th< f of level «.r rntl, or
Commandant of t rine , in case rines,
wil trial by court martial or :uch t.oer action
ee may be warranted.
<•
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